Vargas Paginated Proof (Do Not Delete)

12/13/2012 10:12 AM

Prosecuting Domestic Violence After Giles:
Why a Categorical Approach to the
Forfeiture Doctrine Threatens Female Autonomy
MICHAEL VARGAS
INTRODUCTION
Prosecutors face a unique dilemma in domestic violence cases after Crawford
v. Washington.1 Post-Crawford, the Confrontation Clause requires any statement
deemed “testimonial” to be subject to cross-examination in order to be admitted
against the defendant, no matter how reliable or fundamental the evidence is to
the prosecutor’s case.2 Application of the Confrontation Clause is especially
salient in domestic violence cases because successful prosecution of alleged
abusers often hinges on the admission of “testimonial” out-of-court statements
and sworn affidavits made by a victim of abuse against her spouse.3
Introduction of these accusations of domestic violence into evidence is further
complicated by the fact that a victim of domestic abuse is often reluctant to
cooperate with prosecutors by testifying against her spouse, therefore denying
the defendant any meaningful opportunity for cross-examination.4 As a result,
the Confrontation Clause often precludes admittance of these probative victim
statements. If prosecutors wish to somehow introduce this evidence at trial, they
must seek an alternative means of doing so.
Absent an opportunity for cross-examination, “testimonial” evidence can
only be admitted against the defendant in one of two ways: (1) if the statement in
question was a dying declaration made by the victim when her death was
imminent; or (2) if the defendant has forfeited his right to confrontation by his
own wrongdoing.5 Dying declarations do not play a significant role in domestic

J.D., Duke University School of Law. Special thanks to Professor Lisa Kern Griffin for her
help and support in writing this Note.
1. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
2. Id. at 68 (“Where testimonial evidence is at issue, however, the Sixth Amendment demands
what the common law required: unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination.”);
contra Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980).
3. See Tom Lininger, Reconceptualizing Confrontation After Davis, 85 TEX. L. REV. 271, 281–82
(2006) (noting that prior to Crawford, prosecutors did not depend heavily on live testimony because
the excited utterance hearsay exception allowed admission of the statements of accusers to law
enforcement taken at the scene of the crime; these statements, if not taken to try to defuse an
emergency, would likely qualify as testimonial under Davis).
4. Rebecca McKinstry, “An Exercise in Fiction”: The Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause,
Forfeiture by Wrongdoing, and Domestic Violence in Davis v. Washington, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 531,
531 (2007). Although I recognize that domestic violence can be initiated by either the male or female
spouse, for the sake of clarity in reading and writing this Note, I will use male pronouns to refer to
the abusive spouse and female pronouns to refer to the victim spouse.
5. Tim Donaldson & Karen Olson, “Classic Abusive Relationships” and the Inference of Witness
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violence prosecutions even if the victim dies because the statements sought to be
introduced are usually provided to law enforcement when the victim’s death is
not imminent.6 The forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine, therefore, has become
the primary tool for prosecutors attempting to introduce “testimonial” evidence
at trial when a domestic violence victim refuses to testify against her spouse.
Not surprisingly, domestic violence prosecutors have argued for a broad
application of the forfeiture doctrine that extends even to cases in which the
victim is still alive and has voluntarily decided not to testify against her spouse.7
Their rationale for doing so is as follows: a broad application of the forfeiture
doctrine is necessary, even if the victim voluntarily decides not to testify against
her spouse about prior accusations of abuse, because victims of domestic
violence are being pressured or coerced by the defendant into not testifying for
fear of violent reprisal.8
It may be surprising, though, that this prosecutorial tactic could be backed
by Supreme Court precedent. In Giles v. California,9 the Supreme Court clarified
that the defendant must have specifically intended to prevent a witness from
testifying in order to forfeit his right of confrontation.10 However, the Court also
addressed in dictum the possible application of the forfeiture doctrine in cases of
domestic violence where the crime results in the victim’s death.11 Justice Scalia,
writing for the majority, noted that evidence of prior domestic abuse could be
relevant to the intent inquiry of the forfeiture doctrine because acts of domestic
violence are often intended to dissuade a victim from obtaining any outside
assistance.12 But Justice Souter, in his concurrence, went one step further. Souter
noted that an abusive relationship is per se sufficient to presume the defendant’s
specific intent to prevent the victim from testifying because an abusive
relationship is meant to isolate the victim from any cooperation with law
enforcement.13
This Note argues that in domestic violence cases where the victim is still
alive, the forfeiture doctrine should be concerned solely with the specific intent
of the defendant, as emphasized by the Supreme Court majority in Giles, in lieu
of any categorical alternative. Scalia’s case-by-case approach is underinclusive;
Tampering in Family Violence Cases After Giles v. California, 36 LINCOLN L. REV. 45, 45–46 (2009) (citing
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52).
6. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2).
7. See Adam M. Krischer, “Though Justice May Be Blind, It is Not Stupid”: Applying Common Sense
to Crawford v. Washington in Domestic Violence Cases, 1 THE VOICE 1, 6 (Nov. 2004), available
at http://www.ndaa-apri.org/pdf/the-voice-vol-1-issue-1.pdf (“Prosecutors must educate their
judges that the domestic violence itself may have procured the victim’s unavailability.”).
8. See id. at 3 (“As most . . . domestic violence prosecutors have known for decades, a domestic
violence abuser does not necessarily stop the abuse when the criminal justice system intervenes.
Instead, many abusers become more abusive to reassert control over the victim.”).
9. 554 U.S. 353 (2008).
10. See id. at 367.
11. Id. at 376–77.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 380 (Souter, J., concurring in part) (noting “the absence from the early material of any
reason to doubt that the element of intention would normally be satisfied by the intent inferred on
the part of the domestic abuser in the classic abusive relationship, which is meant to isolate the victim
from outside help, including the aid of law enforcement and the judicial process”).
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in some cases, the inference of the defendant’s specific intent to prevent a victim
from testifying, as ascertained by direct or circumstantial evidence, might be so
strong as to require a (rebuttable) presumption of forfeiture. But Souter’s
categorical approach, while a valuable prospective tool for prosecutors, is
overinclusive; in trying to enhance the voice of domestic violence victims, the
law actually silences victims who do not wish to testify against their spouses by
speaking for them.
Instead, specific intent should remain a primary guiding marker in the
forfeiture inquiry for domestic violence crimes as it is in criminal law generally.
Courts should focus on the specific intent of the defendant through the analysis
of direct or circumstantial evidence because it is only in those cases where such
evidence exists that the victim is actually being coerced into not testifying. That
is, only in cases where there is such evidence has the defendant clearly
manifested his intent to deprive the domestic violence victim of an opportunity
to obtain outside assistance. Therefore, only those cases merit an override of the
victim’s autonomy and voice as to her decision to offer any testimonial evidence.
By not focusing on the specific intent of the defendant, the state will inevitably
silence the voices of those that are already voiceless in the criminal justice
system: victims of domestic abuse.14 Instead of being able to shape their own
destinies, victims of domestic violence have to rely on the state’s blanket
assertion that, in order for women to attain an even footing with their male
counterparts, introducing prior accusations against their explicit wishes is both
in their own best interest and in the best interest of society generally.
In Part I of this Note, I present an overview of the current state of
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, including a discussion of the forfeiture
doctrine. In Part II of this Note, I explain the reasons why prosecutors believe
that a categorical approach to forfeiture is a necessary tool for successful
domestic violence prosecution. In Part III, I argue that such a broad approach to
the forfeiture doctrine relies upon a flawed premise that a victim of domestic
violence would always want to testify against her spouse unless she was being
coerced not to testify. I note that there are both policy and practical reasons
suggesting that such an approach would not automatically vindicate women’s
rights but could actually significantly impair them. In Part IV of this Note, I
compare the forfeiture doctrine in domestic violence cases to the diffusion of the
adverse testimony privilege from an outright prohibition to the current
autonomy-based approach. I will argue that such an approach reasonably
applies to the forfeiture doctrine as well, given that both doctrines involve the
14. Several articles have already been written as to whether a broad forfeiture right could
disintegrate the categorical protection of the Confrontation Clause. This Note, for the most part, will
not focus on this issue beyond the general fact that a broad application threatens the emanating
principles and protections behind the Crawford decision in the context of domestic violence. This Note
will focus instead on the effect that a broad application has on female autonomy and that this is
enough to sway the application of the clause to a focus on specific intent rather than an approach
based on a certain category of crimes (in this case, domestic violence). For further information
relating to a concern about the disintegration of Crawford through a broad application of the forfeiture
doctrine, see Rebecca Sims Talbott, What Remains of the “Forfeited” Right to Confrontation? Restoring
Sixth Amendment Values to the Forfeiture-By-Wrongdoing Rule in Light of Crawford v. Washington and
Giles v. California, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1291 (2010); and James F. Flanagan, In Defense of Giles—A
Response to Professor Lininger, 87 TEX. L. REV. 67, 76–77 (2009).
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exclusion of potentially probative evidence. Finally, in Part V of this article, I
operationalize my theory and argue that a focus on the specific intent of the
defendant is the preferable approach, should the Court wish to vindicate the
victim’s autonomy and voice while preventing further gender inequality.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE FORFEITURE DOCTRINE
A. The Confrontation Clause
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment of the United States
Constitution states that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”15 The Confrontation
Clause protects the defendant from potential federal abuse in several key ways.
For one, the Confrontation Clause codifies the Framers’ foundational belief in the
importance of cross-examination.16 This belief is thought to have emanated from
the common law response to the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, who was found
guilty of treason after various hearsay statements were introduced against him.17
Throughout the proceeding, Raleigh pleaded with the presiding judges to allow
him to confront Lord Cobham, an accusatory witness, in order to expose
Cobham’s accusations as a lie.18
The Confrontation Clause can therefore be interpreted as a response to the
shortcomings of Raleigh’s trial in several ways.19 First, the Confrontation Clause
ensures the reliability of evidence at trial by allowing the defendant to extract the
truth of the matter through cross-examination.20
Second, the right of
confrontation ensures the appearance of procedural fairness and respect for the
accused by providing a mechanism through which the defendant can physically
face his accuser.21 Third, the Confrontation Clause prevents government abuse
by preventing trials by affidavit and potential witness misinterpretation by the
jury.22 However, some ambiguity remained as to the scope of the Confrontation
Clause in determining what specific type of evidence was subject to crossexamination. This question was initially answered in Ohio v. Roberts.23
In Roberts, the Supreme Court clarified that in order to introduce nonconfronted hearsay evidence, the prosecution must satisfy a two-pronged test.

15. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
16. Daniel Shaviro, The Confrontation Clause Today in Light of Its Common Law Background, 26 VAL.
U. L. REV. 337, 341 (1991).
17. Id.; see also David Alan Sklansky, Anti-Inquisitorialism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1634, 1646–47 (2009).
18. Sklansky, supra note 17, at 1647. Raleigh, in his trial, famously pleaded, “[Let] my accuser
come face to face, and be deposed. Were the case but for a small copyhold, you would have witnesses
or good proof to lead the jury to a verdict; and I am here for my life!” William O. Douglas, A
Challenge to the Bar, 28 NOTRE DAME LAW. 497, 499 (1953).
19. See Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1155 (2011) (“The basic purpose of the Confrontation
Clause was to ‘targe[t]’ the sort of ‘abuses’ exemplified at the notorious treason trial of Sir Walter
Raleigh.”).
20. See Talbott, supra note 14, at 1296 (noting that the reliability of evidence is “widely
considered the most ‘central concern’ of the Clause”).
21. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 847 (1990).
22. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 94 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in result).
23. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
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First, the prosecution must demonstrate the unavailability of the declarant whose
statement the prosecution seeks to introduce.24 Then, the prosecution must
prove that the statement itself bears adequate “indicia of reliability” to
“comport[] with the ‘substance of constitutional protection.’”25 If both prongs
are met, then the hearsay evidence can be admitted at trial without being subject
to the defendant’s confrontation. However, this rationale was subsequently
reversed in Crawford v. Washington,26 which now delineates the scope of the
Confrontation Clause.
Under Crawford, only non-testimonial hearsay evidence can be admitted at
trial without being subject to confrontation.27 Crawford supplanted the previous
“reliability of the evidence” inquiry central to the Roberts decision by focusing
instead on the history of the Confrontation Clause. Examination of the clause’s
legislative history provided two key inferences: (1) the Framers were primarily
concerned with the evils associated with the introduction of ex parte
examinations and other forms of testimonial evidence; and (2) the Framers
would never have allowed admission of such testimonial evidence unless the
declarant was unavailable at trial and there was a suitable prior opportunity for
cross-examination.28 The Court added that Roberts’ reliability concern placed too
much focus on the interpretation of an “amorphous concept,” thereby allocating
too much discretion in the hands of judges.29 Instead, the only way to safeguard
the accused from government abuse is for the accused to have a broad
categorical protection in his right to confrontation in lieu of a malleable balancing
test. Questions remained, however, as to how to apply Crawford’s new criterion
for the admission of non-confronted hearsay because the definition of
“testimonial” was “le[ft] for another day.”30
Two years later, the Supreme Court shed some light on the definition of
“testimonial” in Davis v. Washington.31 Davis clarified that statements made to
government officials when not attempting to defuse an emergency situation are
tantamount to statements taken to mount a law enforcement investigation.32
These statements are therefore “testimonial” and must be subject to crossexamination by the defendant if the statements are to be introduced at trial.33 In
24. Id. at 65.
25. Id. at 66.
26. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
27. See id. at 68 (“Where nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent with the
Framers’ design to afford the States flexibility in their development of hearsay law—as
does Roberts, and as would an approach that exempted such statements from Confrontation Clause
scrutiny altogether.”).
28. Id. at 50–55.
29. Id. at 61.
30. Id. at 68.
31. 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
32. Id. at 822.
33. See generally id. at 828. The Davis case was consolidated with Hammon v. Indiana, another
domestic violence case in which introduction of probative statements depended on whether it was
deemed “testimonial” or not. The Davis case concerned a 911 call in which the victim of a domestic
disturbance relayed to the 911 operator that the defendant was in the process of hitting her with his
fists. The court determined that this statement was not testimonial because the purpose of the
statement made to the 911 operator was to defuse an ongoing emergency. This determination was

Vargas Paginated Proof (Do Not Delete)

178 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY

12/13/2012 10:12 AM

Volume 20:173 2012

determining whether statements elicited from the witness by law enforcement
qualify as “testimonial” under this logic, lower courts are to apply a “primary
purpose test.”34 That is, lower courts must determine whether the primary
purpose in obtaining the statement is to either defuse an emergency situation or
to mount a law enforcement investigation.35 But even though the Supreme Court
provided the lower courts with some guidance as to how to determine whether
evidence qualifies as “testimonial,” it still remained unclear how expansive the
scope of an emergency might be and whose primary purpose is determinative in
assessing whether the given statement is “testimonial,” that of the declarant or
that of the law enforcement official.
Recently, in Michigan v. Bryant, the Supreme Court elaborated on the scope
of what qualifies as an emergency response, noting that the scope can be quite
broad.36 Bryant involved statements made by a victim who was shot and later
discovered by law enforcement in a gas station parking lot.37 After police
questioning at the gas station, the victim identified the shooter and told police
that he recognized the shooter’s voice before being shot.38 The Court clarified
that these statements, identifying the shooter, qualified as “nontestimonial”
because (1) the police officers were attempting to defuse an ongoing emergency,
given that the defendant carried a gun and presented a threat to the public at
large; and (2) the victim had no viable reason to fabricate the statements.39 When
someone is severely injured at the scene of a crime, the Court noted, there can be
little doubt that the statements being made are reliable because the witness
would have little reason to fabricate any evidence.40
In Bryant, the Supreme Court again emphasized the reliability of the
statements in question in determining whether the Confrontation Clause applies
in lieu of the broad categorical safeguard of Crawford. Use of such broad
reliability language in Bryant likely means that fewer statements will be deemed
testimonial in the future, thereby relegating the utility of the forfeiture doctrine
to a secondary tool for prosecutors seeking to admit probative evidence.41 What
contrasted with the Hammon case, in which the victim’s statement was taken by an officer at the scene
of the crime after both the victim and the accused were already separated, and after the accused no
longer posed any further threat to the victim. The court reasoned that this statement was testimonial
because the police officer at the scene took the statements with the primary purpose of assembling
“replies for use in his ‘investigat[ion].’” Id. at 830.
34. Id. at 822.
35. Id.
36. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011).
37. Id. at 1150.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1166–67.
40. See id. at 1157 (“Implicit in Davis is the idea that because the prospect of fabrication in
statements given for the primary purpose of resolving that emergency is presumably significantly
diminished, the Confrontation Clause does not require such statements to be subject to the crucible of
cross-examination.”).
41. This is because the scope of an emergency seems to be much more expansive than previously
believed, given that the shooter was no longer present and given that the harm had already occurred
in the past. Rather, the officers explicitly noted that their purpose in being at the gas station and in
asking the victim questions was simply to apprehend the suspect. Id. at 1151. So, it is quite possible
that statements that would otherwise be deemed “testimonial” under Crawford and Davis are now
likely to be deemed “nontestimonial” after Bryant. These nontestimonial statements under Bryant
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is clear is that the scope of the Confrontation Clause is still in flux and that the
forfeiture doctrine presents a salient, albeit perhaps secondary, solution to the
introduction of testimonial evidence under Crawford.
B. The Forfeiture Doctrine
Most important for the purpose of this Note is the Court’s discussion in
Giles v. California as to when a defendant has forfeited his right to confrontation,
even if the evidence sought to be admitted against him undoubtedly qualifies as
“testimonial.”42 In 2002, Dwayne Giles killed Brenda Avie, shooting her six
times.43 Giles alleged that the shooting was in self-defense.44 Three weeks before
this incident, Avie provided several statements to law enforcement about an
alleged domestic altercation.45 Specifically, Avie alleged that Giles, her boyfriend
at the time, had repeatedly punched her in the hand and face, choked her, and
threatened to stab her with a knife.46 At trial, the California prosecutor
attempted to introduce these statements to rebut Giles’ affirmative defense,47
even though, under Crawford, these statements were plainly testimonial.48
According to California law at the time, statements describing the infliction
or threat of physical violence were admissible in open court when the declarant
is both unavailable and when the prior statements are deemed particularly
trustworthy.49 The underlying rationale for the admission of these statements is
that the doctrine of forfeiture applies as an equitable principle to ensure that a
defendant does not benefit from his own wrongdoing by procuring witness
unavailability through the threat of violence.50 In other words, the law
establishes that the defendant should be precluded from raising a Confrontation
Clause-based defense since he seemingly procured the witness’s absence
himself.51 Both the California Court of Appeals and the California Supreme
Court found this to be a proper application of the doctrine of forfeiture and
concluded that the statements were admissible against Giles in court because: (1)
Giles caused Avie’s unavailability by murdering her; and (2) there was no reason
to suspect Avie’s statements to law enforcement three weeks prior to the crime’s

might very well include prior accusations of domestic violence since the defendant is still at large and
likely still living with his spouse.
42. Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008).
43. Id. at 356.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 356–57.
47. Id. at 356.
48. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52 (2004) (“Statements taken by police officers in
the course of interrogations are also testimonial under even a narrow standard.”).
49. CAL. EVID. CODE. § 1370 (West Supp. 2008). Note that this law is very similar to the Supreme
Court’s formulation in Ohio v. Roberts, overturned in Crawford v. Washington.
50. Giles, 554 U.S. at 357.
51. See, e.g., GEOFFREY GILBERT, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 141 (1756), available at
http://books.google.com/books?id=6MwDAAAAQAAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_sum
mary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false(noting a defendant “shall never be admitted to shelter himself
by such evil Practices on the Witness, that being to give him Advantage of his own Wrong”).
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commission were not trustworthy.52
The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts, noting that in order for the
defendant to forfeit his right of confrontation, the defendant must have
wrongfully procured the unavailability of the witness with the specific intent to
prevent the victim from testifying.53 Unlike the California statute in question, the
defendant’s knowledge that performing a certain intimidating act could prevent a
witness from testifying does not suffice for the admission of hearsay evidence.54
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, clarified that while the doctrine of
forfeiture may be equitable in nature, it was primarily intended to target
defendants who attempt to “bribe, intimidate, or kill any witnesses against him
. . . .”55 It was therefore not aimed at ensuring that any defendant who
wrongfully caused the absence of a victim from the witness stand be deprived of
an opportunity for cross examination without any inquiry into his mens rea. A
contrary reading would be dangerous for two reasons. First, this approach
would require a prior judicial determination that the defendant is guilty of the
act in question for which the defendant is at trial before the issue ever reaches the
jury.56 Second, a judicial determination of what is “fair” amounts to “a thinly
veiled invitation to overrule Crawford” by returning to the reliability concern in
Roberts.57 This is because Crawford specifically mandated a broad categorical
guarantee in lieu of a judicial determination on the application of the amorphous
concept of “reliability.”58
The Court also addressed, in dictum, the role that the forfeiture doctrine
might specifically play in domestic violence cases. The majority opinion plainly
asserts that the forfeiture doctrine always requires an inquiry into the specific
intent of the defendant, even if such an inquiry would be detrimental to the
conviction of potential domestic abusers.59
There cannot be a unique
Confrontation Clause approach to domestic violence crimes, according to the
majority, which renders the defendant’s mens rea irrelevant due to concerns
about fundamental fairness.60 That is not to say, however, that the domestic
violence context plays no role in determining whether the defendant has
forfeited his right to confrontation: “Acts of domestic violence often are intended
to dissuade a victim from resorting to outside help, and include conduct
designed to prevent testimony to police officers or cooperation in criminal
prosecutions.”61 So, if the victim dies, previous evidence of abuse or threats of

52. Giles, 554 U.S. at 357.
53. Id. at 367–68.
54. See id. at 367 (“‘Forfeiture by wrongdoing,’ . . . applies only when the defendant ‘engaged or
acquiesced in wrongdoing that was intended to, and did, procure the unavailability of the declarant
as a witness.’”) (emphasis added).
55. Id. at 374.
56. See id. at 365 (noting that such a rationale “does not sit well with the right to trial by jury”).
57. Id. at 374.
58. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004).
59. See Giles, 554 U.S. at 376.
60. Id. (“Is the suggestion that we should have one Confrontation Clause (the one the Framers
adopted and Crawford described) for all other crimes, but a special, improvised, Confrontation Clause
for those crimes that are frequently directed against women?”).
61. Id. at 377.
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abuse could be highly relevant in determining the defendant’s mens rea at the
time of the crime.62
In his concurrence, Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg, agreed with
the majority’s formulation of the forfeiture doctrine but argued that the majority
adopted the wrong approach as to the role that evidence of past abuse or threats
of abuse plays in the forfeiture inquiry.63 Like the majority, Souter argued that
the intent requirement for the forfeiture doctrine can be satisfied by an inference
that the accuser sought to prevent the victim from testifying and that he intended
to “thwart the judicial process” in doing so.64 Souter differentiated himself from
Scalia, however, by stating that in the “classic abusive relationship,” the element
of intent would be satisfied more often than not because abusive relationships,
by their very nature, are “meant to isolate the victim from outside help.”65 If this
fundamental premise is correct, Souter argued, there is no reason to think that,
prior to the commission of the act in question, the abusive defendant
“abandoned the dynamics of [the abusive relationship].”66 That is, unlike Scalia’s
formulation in which evidence of an abusive relationship is one of several factors
that can be used to infer the defendant’s specific intent, an abusive relationship,
according to Souter, constitutes per se forfeiture without any further inquiry
needed into the defendant’s mens rea.67
Writing for the dissent, Justice Breyer also seemingly endorsed Souter’s
view, “recogniz[ing] that ‘domestic violence’ cases are ‘notoriously susceptible to
intimidation or coercion of the victim to ensure that she does not testify at
trial.’”68 Therefore, it is acceptable to presume purpose “based on no more than
evidence of a history of domestic violence.”69
Albeit dictum, such persuasive reasoning has allowed prosecutors to argue
for a broad application of the forfeiture doctrine in all domestic violence cases,
even where the victim is still alive but refuses to cooperate. Their reason for
proffering such a broad application of the forfeiture doctrine is as follows.
II. A BROAD FORFEITURE APPLICATION IN LIVING VICTIM CASES
In 1994, the Violence Against Women Act70 (VAWA) put a national
spotlight on the state’s general inability to protect victims of domestic violence.71
Traditionally, the state restricted the crime of domestic violence to the private
sphere, insisting that domestic interference was outside of the state’s police

62. Id.
63. Id. at 379–80 (Souter, J., concurring).
64. Id. at 380 (Souter, J., concurring).
65. Id.
66. See id. (“If the evidence for admissibility shows a continuing relationship of this sort, it
would make no sense to suggest that the oppressing defendant miraculously abandoned the
dynamics of abuse the instant before he killed his victim, say, in a fit of anger.”).
67. See id.
68. Id. at 406 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 832–33 (2006)).
69. Id.
70. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902.
71. G. Kristian Miccio, Notes from the Underground: Battered Women, the State, and Conceptions of
Accountability, 23 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 133, 157 (2008).
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power.72 But by labeling domestic violence as a private act, the state
relinquished any obligation to assist those subject to systematic abuse. This
systematic violence, some argue, has perpetuated gender inequities because the
abuser attains a position of power over his abused.73 VAWA sought to remedy
this abuse and gender inequality by providing increased federal funding for the
investigation and prosecution of domestic violence crimes. However, the
resulting media attention relating to the passage of VAWA also seemingly placed
considerable pressure on prosecutors to secure convictions of alleged domestic
abusers.74
Prosecutors responded to this national spotlight on domestic violence in
several ways. First, as a public policy measure, states accorded the same level of
intervention to the crime of domestic violence as they would accord to any other
crime under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.75 Second, in
order to institute these measures, several states, including New York, adopted
no-drop policies that force state prosecutors to press charges whenever an
alleged instance of domestic violence is reported to the State Attorney’s Office by
law enforcement, regardless of whether or not the victim wants to press
charges.76 Third, if the victim refused to assist the government in the prosecution
of her spouse by making herself unavailable,77 prosecutors would still attempt to
proffer past accusations of domestic violence at trial by arguing that introduction
of these statements was both necessary and reliable under the Roberts regime.78
With the subsequent change in Supreme Court case law, many prosecutors
came to believe that Crawford posed a large hurdle to domestic violence
convictions.79 In cases of domestic violence, often the lone two witnesses, or at
least the most important two witnesses, are the abusive spouse and the victim
spouse.80 The abusive spouse is unlikely to testify because he can assert his Fifth
Amendment privilege.81 This means the victim spouse often holds the key to the

72. Id.
73. See generally Sarah F. Russell, Covering Women and Violence: Media Treatment of VAWA’s Civil
Rights Remedy, 9 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 327(2003).
74. See generally id.
75. See Sarah M. Buel, Effective Assistance of Counsel for Battered Women Defendants: A Normative
Construct, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 217, 231 (2003); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
76. See Elaine Chiu, Confronting the Agency in Battered Mothers, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1223, 1226
(2001).
77. The victim in a domestic violence prosecution can make herself unavailable in various ways.
For example, the victim can make herself unavailable by contempt of court, by privilege, or by failure
to appear. See Brian J. Hurley, Confrontation and the Unavailable Witness: Searching for a Standard, 18
VAL. U. L. REV. 193, 194–95 (1983); Lisa Kern Griffin, Circling Around the Confrontation Clause: Redefined
Reach but not a Robust Right, 105 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 16 (2006), http://students.law.
umich.edu/mlr/firstimpressions/vol105/griffin.pdf.
78. See, e.g., Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
79. See Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford, 91 VA. L. REV. 747, 750 (“In a survey
of over 60 prosecutors’ offices in California, Oregon, and Washington, 63 percent of respondents
reported the Crawford decision has significantly impeded prosecutions of domestic violence.”).
80. See JOHN E. B. MYERS, MYERS ON EVIDENCE IN CHILD, DOMESTIC AND ELDER ABUSE CASES,
VOLUME 1 849 (2005).
81. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be . . . compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself . . . .”).
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successful prosecution of the accused. In Giles, Scalia correctly pointed out that
statements concerning the abuse made to friends and neighbors, as well as to
physicians in the course of treatment, would still be admissible post-Crawford
should these statements satisfy state hearsay rules.82 But oftentimes the sole
evidence in these cases, or at least the most probative evidence in these private
altercations, will be in the form of statements or affidavits made to law
enforcement by the victim concerning prior instances of abuse, which
undoubtedly qualify as “testimonial” under Crawford.83 Therefore, there are only
two ways to introduce such powerful probative evidence in the domestic
violence context post-Crawford: (1) subject the evidence to cross-examination; or
(2) argue that the defendant has forfeited his right to confrontation due to his
own wrongdoing.
The first option is not very promising. Historically, spouses were
disqualified from testifying against their spouses in court.84 While there is now
only a privilege where there was once a general prohibition,85 an abused spouse
is still generally reluctant to testify against the defendant spouse. Various
empirical studies suggest that victims of domestic violence are more likely to
recant prior statements or to refuse to testify than are victims of any other
crime.86 About eighty percent of accusers in domestic violence prosecutions
refuse to cooperate with the government at some point in the case.87 Their
reasons for this reluctance vary. Testifying is an inherently stressful event and
testifying against one’s spouse can be even more stressful.88 It certainly does not
help the prosecution either that victims can easily avoid testifying by asserting
the adverse testimony privilege, which allows the victim to choose to what
degree, if any, she wishes to testify against her spouse.89 Even in states like New
York where such a marital testimonial privilege does not exist, the victim spouse
may elect to make herself unavailable by placing herself in contempt in lieu of
testifying. So, if the prosecution is to introduce these probative statements, the
most likely means of doing so is by virtue of the forfeiture doctrine.
There certainly are valid policy reasons to believe that a broad forfeiture
application is necessary to secure the conviction of domestic abusers. About one

82. Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 376 (2008); see also FED. R. EVID. 803(4) (noting that
“[s]tatements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or
past or present symptoms” are not excluded by the hearsay rule).
83. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51–52 (2004).
84. Myrna S. Raeder, Thoughts About Giles and Forfeiture in Domestic Violence Cases, 75 BROOK. L.
REV. 1329, 1333 (2010).
85. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 53 (1980).
86. See Lininger, supra note 79, at 751, 768–69 (“Recent evidence suggests that 80 to 85 percent of
battered women will recant at some point.”); see also Douglas E. Beloof & Joel Shapiro, Let the Truth Be
Told: Proposed Hearsay Exceptions to Admit Domestic Violence Victims’ Out of Court Statements as
Substantive Evidence, 11 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 3 (2002) (estimating that ninety percent of domestic
violence victims recant).
87. Lisa Marie De Sanctis, Bridging the Gap Between the Rules of Evidence and Justice for Victims of
Domestic Violence, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 359, 367 (1996); Lininger, supra note 79, at 751.
88. See Flanagan, supra note 14, at 76.
89. See Trammel, 445 U.S. at 53 (1980) (concluding that the witness-spouse may neither be
compelled to, nor foreclosed from, testifying).
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in five victims of domestic violence is repeatedly battered.90 It is additionally
estimated that up to ninety percent of battered women never report this abuse.91
Of those incidents that are reported to police, nearly half of the victims allege
that their spouses threatened them with physical violence should they assist the
prosecution.92 Should the victims decide to leave their partners during their
spouses’ prosecution, studies suggest that this departure period is the most
dangerous period for victims of abuse.93 During this period, married, female
victims of domestic violence are four times more likely to report being raped,
assaulted, or stalked.94 Further, it cannot be doubted that violence can be used as
a method of control in abusive relationships to dissuade victims from obtaining
outside help. Due to this likelihood of coercion in abusive relationships by means
of violence, there is no doubt that forfeiture must play a key role in domestic
violence prosecutions, even in living victim cases. The difficulty lies in
determining the scope of that role.
Under Justice Souter’s formulation in Giles, forfeiture applies as long as the
relationship in question qualifies as a “classic abusive relationship.”95 But it is
unclear exactly what a “classic abusive relationship” is and how broad this
designation might be. As a result, Souter’s formulation could seemingly extend
to all domestic violence prosecutions, including those in which the victim is alive
but unavailable (whether through privilege, contempt, or physical
unavailability). If the trial court finds as a matter of fact that the defendant and
the victim were involved in a “classic abusive relationship,” then it will be
presumed that the defendant procured the unavailability of the victim. Thus, a
defendant could forfeit his right to confrontation in a domestic violence case
simply because a living spouse has refused to testify against him. It is further
unclear whether this presumption would be rebuttable.96
However, this formulation is questionable because it hinges on a flawed
premise: that a victim of domestic abuse would always want to testify against
her spouse absent the defendant’s coercion. Such a fundamental premise is not
accurate in its blanket application to all domestic violence cases for various
reasons. First, it is unclear as a matter of policy whether the forced introduction
of past accusations of abuse really vindicates the autonomy of women. It is quite
possible that this policy does the exact opposite.97 Second, there are various
practical reasons why a victim of abuse might not want to testify against her
spouse absent any abuse or coercion, including economic and familial concerns.
If there is no probative evidence to suggest that she is being coerced into not

90. Alana Dunnigan, Restoring Power to the Powerless: The Need to Reform California’s Mandatory
Mediation for Victims of Domestic Violence, 37 U.S.F. L. Rev. 1031, 1038-40 (2003).
91. Id.
92. Krischer, supra note 7, at 3.
93. PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, EXTENT, NATURE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF INTIMATE
PARTNER VIOLENCE: FINDINGS FROM THE NAT’L VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY 37 (2000).
94. Id. In addition, male victims of domestic violence are three times as likely to report being
raped, assaulted, or stalked during this period. Id.
95. Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 380 (2008) (Souter, J., concurring).
96. Given that Justice Souter claimed that such a finding would constitute per se forfeiture
instead of a strong presumption of forfeiture.
97. See infra Section III.
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testifying, the victim’s decision should be respected. Rather, the focus should
turn to any legislative alternatives that would allow the victim to safely flee from
an abusive spouse of her own volition.
If prosecution of domestic violence was meant to cure the systematic
violence against women that perpetuates gender inequality, a categorical
approach to forfeiture in these cases actually threatens gender equality in a
reciprocal fashion. A categorical approach allows the state to assert power over
the “victimized” by silencing her wants and needs without any specific
consideration as to whether her decision was actually coerced. The many
reasons why a broad application of forfeiture threatens female voice and
autonomy are discussed below.
III. WHY AN OVERBROAD APPROACH THREATENS FEMALE AUTONOMY
Criminal law is a sanction for actions committed against the state, not for
actions committed against a particular individual. For that reason, the victim’s
consent is not traditionally required for the prosecution of the defendant. That is
not to say, however, that the victim’s consent does not play a key role in the
prosecutor’s determination as to whether the state will press charges or not.
Without the victim’s consent, prosecution of the accused can be extremely
challenging since the victim is often a key witness.98 So, if the victim does not
want to press charges, oftentimes the prosecutor will abide by those wishes and
drop the case given the difficulty that the victim’s lack of cooperation has on
proving the elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Yet, under no-drop
policies for domestic violence prosecutions, which many jurisdictions have
adopted, a prosecutor cannot drop the case even if the victim does not wish to
proceed. Instead, prosecutors are forced to try the case and introduce whatever
probative evidence can be admitted, even if the evidence is admitted without the
victim’s consent.
For the most part, states have not adopted different prosecutorial policies
regarding the admission of non-confronted victim testimony for cases in which
the victim has died and for cases in which the victim is still alive. In domestic
violence cases where the victim has died, the state obviously has a heightened
responsibility to prosecute the accused. In these cases, the state can easily imply
the victim’s willingness to press charges against her spouse given the fact that
she was murdered and thereby silenced. However, living victim domestic
violence cases are different in one key way from cases in which the victim has
died – living victims still have a voice. But the prosecutorial tactic applied to
these wholly different cases is wholly the same: the state presumes the victim’s
willingness to assist the prosecution because she is viewed as irreversibly
victimized.
Feminist thought is concerned with how oppressive power structures affect
female autonomy and voice.99 One such oppressive power structure is the state,

98. MYERS, supra note 80, at 849.
99. Mallika Kaur Sarkaria, Lessons from Punjab’s “Missing Girls”: Toward a Global Feminist
Perspective on “Choice” in Abortion, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 905, 906 (2009).
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traditionally assumed to be patriarchal.100 One way to overcome the state’s
patriarchal stranglehold is to endorse a normative approach that promotes
freedom of choice for women in all aspects of their lives.101 The recognition that
a victim of abuse may still be psychologically able to control the prosecution of
her accused in accordance with her long-term best interests aligns with this
normative approach.
By allowing prosecutors to pursue cases without any input from victims, a
categorical approach to abusive relationships denies exactly that which many
feminists suggest is necessary for gender equality: choice and an opportunity to
voice one’s wishes. As such, a broad application of forfeiture inevitably
disempowers women in the following way: women will either be forced to testify
against their spouses indirectly through the admission of non-confronted prior
accusations, or they will be socially castigated for remaining in an abusive
relationship that they cannot control.102 This is due to the fact that a broad
application of forfeiture presumes that the abused has been victimized to the
point that she is weak, helpless, and unable to make informed, voluntary
decisions.103 A broad application presumes that the only way to prevent this
coercion is for the state to intervene and silence the victim’s overt wishes by
asserting that violence and coercion have overridden individual agency. In other
words, for a prosecutor to respect the wishes of a victim not to press charges, the
victim must instruct the prosecutor to drop the charges with informed consent.
But the state presumes that a victim of domestic violence can never provide
informed consent because the consent is believed to have been compelled by fear,
coercion, or involuntariness.
There are seemingly two main reasons why prosecutors and policymakers
assume that domestic violence victims do not have the adequate agency to
function as atomistic individuals. The first reason is due to dangerous, overbroad
generalizations that manifest themselves into overt prosecutorial policies. The
second reason is due to a failure to recognize the various practical and often
safety-related reasons why a victim might not want to testify against her spouse
even absent coercion.
A. Policy Reasons
One dangerous overgeneralization that manifests itself into a broad
forfeiture application is the widely held belief that all battered women behave
within the confines of the battered woman’s syndrome. The battered woman’s
syndrome rose to prominence in criminal law cases in the 1970s as an attempted

100. R.W. Connell, The State, Gender, and Sexual Politics: Theory and Appraisal, 19 THEORY & SOC’Y
507, 508 (1990) (noting that “[r]ecent theoretical writing contains a remarkable series of sketches of a
theory of the patriarchal state . . .”).
101. Sarkaria, supra note 99, at 936.
102. Chiu, supra note 76, at 1225 (noting that battered women usually end up either being denied
a voice by the system, or being blamed for their abuse).
103. See id. Chiu argues that some policies in the criminal justice system “consider battered
women to be weak and helpless.” Id. She claims that one of these policies is a no-drop system. Id. at
1230-32. I argue that another such policy is a potential categorical approach to the doctrine of
forfeiture-by-wrongdoing.
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self-defense justification for the murder of an abusive spouse committed by the
abused spouse.104 The battered woman’s syndrome contains two distinct
elements: (1) “a cycle of violence“; and (2) “learned helplessness.”105 The “cycle
of violence” element of the battered woman’s syndrome consists of three phases
that determine the behavior of the battered spouse.106 First, there is a period of
initial tension that consists of verbal abuse and minor psychological abuse.107 In
this period, the woman will try to calm her abuser down or will be abnormally
kind to the abuser to appease him and to prevent any violent escalation.108
Second, there is a period of battering where women are subjected to the most
dangerous period of physical abuse.109 A woman’s behavior during this period
is solely concerned with protecting herself from further violence, recognizing
that any resistance will only make the violence worse.110 The third phase, known
as the “honeymoon phase,”111 involves a period of reconciliation whereupon the
batterer apologizes for his behavior and claims that he will never employ such
violence again.112 Here, the woman remains in the relationship believing that her
spouse has changed his violent ways or hopeful that she can be a catalyst for
future change.113 Prosecutors likely would allege that battered women are in this
final phase when the state decides to intervene since the domestic violence
incident in question would have only recently occurred.
But it is considerably overbroad and dangerous to assume that all battered
women act within the confines of the battered woman’s syndrome, especially if
this means that the victims of abuse are going to be deprived of their voice and
their ability to choose what is in their best interests. Many academics
documenting battered women have noted that victims of domestic abuse do not
consider themselves to be within the confines of the battered woman’s syndrome
because they do not consider themselves to be “exclusively victimized.”114 There
should indeed be some legitimate concern that a victim might be in denial when
refusing to testify against her spouse. However, a proper solution to this concern
should not consist of a jurisprudential doctrine that inhibits both her autonomy
and her voice by applying a blanket assertion of coercion that characterizes the
abused spouse as irreversibly “victimized” simply because she has been abused
in the past. Rather, there should be an analogous concern that an overemphasis

104. Melanie Frager Griffith, Battered Woman Syndrome: A Tool for Batterers?, 64 FORDHAM L. REV.
141, 143 (1995) (“Since its inception in the late 1970s, the battered woman syndrome has benefited
victims of domestic violence–-most prominently, those women who are on trial for killing their
batterers and who plead self-defense.”).
105. Id. at 165.
106. LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 55 (1979).
107. Id. at 56.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 59.
110. LENORE E. WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE: WHY BATTERED WOMEN KILL AND HOW SOCIETY
RESPONDS 44 (1989).
111. Mira Mihajlovich, Does Plight Make Right: The Battered Woman Syndrome, Expert Testimony and
the Law of Self-Defense, 62 IND. L. J. 1253, 1259 (1987).
112. TERRIFYING LOVE, supra note 110, at 44–45.
113. Id. at 45.
114. Chiu, supra note 76, at 1247–48.
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on victimization could become a self-fulfilling prophecy by “discouraging people
who are victimized from developing their own strengths or working to resist the
limitations they encounter.”115 This is especially true if there are practical
reasons why it might not be in the abused spouse’s immediate best interest to
testify against her spouse even absent coercion.
B. Practical Concerns
There is a misinformed belief that victims of domestic violence have no
justifiable reason for making themselves unavailable at trial outside of the fear of
violent reprisal by their abusive spouse. In fact, there are legitimate, informed
reasons why a victim of domestic violence might refuse to testify and might
make herself unavailable at trial for the sake of her immediate best interest. First,
when a battered woman calls for emergency assistance, it cannot be
automatically concluded that she wants the police to get involved. Often, those
calling for help solely desire medical assistance.116 Second, victims of domestic
violence might not want to testify against their spouses because of economicallymotivated concerns. Poor women are significantly more likely than more
affluent women to experience domestic violence. Women whose household
adjusted gross income (AGI) is less than $7,500 per year are over four times more
likely to be abused than their more affluent counterparts with household AGIs
over $75,000 per year.117 Abused women also might not want to participate in
any legal proceedings against their spouses for fear that their children will be
placed in protective custody because they permitted an abusive relationship to
occur.118 Third, unique circumstances may preclude any desire for state
intervention.119 For example, undocumented immigrants might not want law
enforcement involvement for fear of deportation resulting from the
government’s investigation into the domestic dispute.120
A victim of domestic abuse might also refuse to participate in legal
proceedings against her spouse because of a desire to preserve her marriage,
often for religious reasons. Various critics are skeptical about the authenticity of
the preservation of marriage justification for many compelling reasons.121
However, the Supreme Court has recognized that the preservation of marriage is

115. Martha Minow, Surviving Victim Talk, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1411, 1429 (1993). Minow warns that
continuing to label the victim as “victimized” can “suppress the strengths and capacities of people
who are victims. Victim talk can have a kind of self-fulfilling quality.” Id.
116. See Chiu, supra note 76, at 1230.
117. LAWRENCE A. GREENFIELD ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, VIOLENCE BY INMATES:
ANALYSIS OF DATA ON CRIMES BY CURRENT OR FORMER SPOUSES, BOYFRIENDS, AND GIRLFRIENDS 14
(1998), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/vi.pdf.
118. See, e.g., Karen Houppert, Victimizing the Victims, THE VILLAGE VOICE, June 15, 1999, at 42,
available at http://www.villagevoice.com/issues/9923/houppert.php (noting that battered women
are being charged with “failure to protect” and risk losing custody of their children for allowing them
to be exposed to domestic violence).
119. Deidre Ewing, Note, Prosecuting Batterers in the Wake of Davis and Hammon, 35 AM. J. CRIM.
L. 91, 96 (2007).
120. Id.
121. See, e.g., Amanda H. Frost, Updating the Marital Privileges: A Witness-Centered Rationale, 14
WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 21–24 (1999).
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a legitimate enough interest to allow a testifying spouse to assert a privilege
which would exclude potentially probative evidence at trial.122 It is unclear then
why the preservation of marriage would not be a legitimate enough interest for
an abused spouse to voluntarily make herself unavailable at trial as well.
A categorical application of the forfeiture doctrine presents a very similar
threat to the institution of marriage as would the complete eradication of the
adverse testimony privilege.123 By not allowing the victim to decide whether she
should indirectly testify against her spouse without any further inquiry into the
extent of the abuse and the specific intent of the defendant, we limit her
autonomy and her voice. Rather than taking such a broad approach, the
forfeiture doctrine should mirror the evolution of the adverse testimony
privilege, laid out in the next section, to one that involves at least some measure
of autonomy, while recognizing the large possibility of spousal coercion.
Allowing a similar measure of autonomy in the forfeiture doctrine as that found
in the adverse testimony privilege will at the very least promote legal
consistency and a mutual recognition of the importance of a testifying spouse’s
right to shape her own destiny.
IV. THE ADVERSE TESTIMONY PRIVILEGE AND SPOUSAL AUTONOMY
There are currently two evidentiary privileges related to marriage: the
confidential communications privilege and the adverse testimony privilege. The
former protects private marital communications from being divulged in court,
while the latter protects spouses from being compelled to incriminate one
another.124 The confidential communications privilege is similar to the attorneyclient privilege in that it only protects against the disclosure of communication
made in confidence during the course of marriage. The adverse testimony
privilege, on the other hand, protects all sorts of incriminating disclosures,
whether pertaining to confidential communications or not, made before or
during the course of a lawful marriage.
The adverse testimony privilege has a long common law history. What is
now a privilege was once a general prohibition on one’s ability to testify against
his or her spouse.125 There were various justifications for this per se prohibition.
First, medieval canons of jurisprudence focused on the notion of a unity in
marriage, therefore allowing the accused spouse to prohibit the testifying spouse
from taking the stand against him because it was akin to self-incrimination.126 In

122. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 53 (1980).
123. I admit that there might be very compelling reasons to actually do away with the marital
privilege completely but that is not the crux of my argument. My only concern is that if Supreme
Court jurisprudence recognizes that the desire to preserve one’s marriage is a compelling justification
important enough to protect with a common law evidentiary privilege, then there should be some
consistency by allowing a similar rationale to apply to the forfeiture doctrine. For a very compelling
argument as to why complete eradication of the adverse testimonial privilege might make for good
policy, see generally Frost, supra note 121.
124. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 44–46.
125. Frost, supra note 121, at 8.
126. See Trammel, 445 U.S. at 44 (noting that, in medieval jurisprudence, the husband and wife
were considered one).
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1933, this blanket rule of spousal disqualification was abolished.127 Later,
proponents of the adverse testimony privilege began to focus on the sanctity of
marriage and concluded that the incrimination of one spouse by another would
inevitably destroy the marital union.128 Thus, what had been an automatic
disqualification evolved into a spousal privilege. But there still remained some
discrepancy as to who retained the privilege – the defendant or the testifying
spouse.
In United States v. Trammel, the Supreme Court clarified that the testifying
spouse retains the adverse testimony privilege.129 In other words, the testifying
spouse has the opportunity to decide whether or not she wants to testify against
her spouse. The Court’s decision to mitigate such a broad-sweeping privilege
was motivated by three core concerns. First, there was a clear concern about the
heightened possibility of injustice caused by the exclusion of probative evidence
that would result if the defendant spouse held the privilege.130 Second, the
allegedly important interests related to the sanctity of marriage that had
previously required such a broad-sweeping marital privilege were no longer
compelling. The Court suggested that the preservation of marriage remains a
strong justification for the existence of a spousal privilege, but reasoned that if
the testifying spouse is willing to testify against the defendant spouse then there
is little marriage worth saving.131 Finally, the Court noted that there should be
some semblance of judicial recognition of female autonomy: “Nowhere in the
common-law world – indeed in any modern society – is a woman regarded as
chattel or demeaned by denial of a separate legal identity and the dignity
associated with recognition as a whole human being.”132
In Trammel, the Supreme Court was noticeably cynical about the need for an
adverse testimony privilege, given the existence of the marital communications
privilege. However, the fact that the Court did not attenuate the privilege at all
is quite suggestive of important underlying considerations. In not striking down
the adverse testimony privilege, the Court recognized that the decision to
preserve one’s marriage justifies the exclusion of potentially probative evidence.
Further, the Court maintained that the testifying spouse should be allowed to
choose for herself whether she will risk the potential dissolution of her marriage
by testifying against her spouse. If this is the case for an evidentiary privilege, it
is unclear why the same rationale should not also extend to the forfeiture
doctrine. A categorical approach to forfeiture undermines the very autonomy
concerns deemed compelling in Trammel, while dealing with evidence of
similarly probative force. If that is the case, then it is quite clear that another
approach should be applied instead to obtain consistency in the law of evidence.

127. See Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 380–81 (1933).
128. See id. at 381 (“It has been said that to admit such testimony is against public policy because
it would endanger the harmony and confidences of marital relations . . . .”).
129. 445 U.S. at 53.
130. Id. at 51–52.
131. Id. at 52.
132. Id.
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V. A CONTEXTUAL APPROACH TO FORFEITURE IN LIVING VICTIM CASES
The Supreme Court’s formulation of the forfeiture doctrine in Giles provides
an approach that is already sufficiently clear for trial courts to apply and allows
for some consideration of victim autonomy without needing to resort to any
categorical alternatives. Under Giles, a defendant has forfeited his right to
confrontation when he has procured the witness’s unavailability with the specific
intent to prevent the witness from testifying.133 This approach is what I label a
“contextual approach” or an “intent-based approach,” as opposed to a
“categorical approach.”
A contextual approach to forfeiture in cases of domestic violence is
straightforward: in order to determine whether the defendant has forfeited his
right to confrontation by his own wrongdoing, the lower court must review the
contextual details of the abusive relationship, along with several other factors, to
determine whether there is enough evidence to infer the defendant’s specific
intent to procure the witness’s unavailability.134
In contrast, a categorical approach applies a certain exception to the general
rule for a specific category of cases.135 In the present context, the category would
be defined as cases of domestic violence where the victim and the defendant are
involved in a “classic abusive relationship.”136 Under a categorical approach, a
lower court factual finding of a “classic abusive relationship” would
automatically presume forfeiture.137
Although very persuasive arguments exist, there is no immediate reason to
deviate from a contextual approach to a categorical approach simply because the
crime involves domestic violence. Specific intent matters just as much in the
domestic violence context as it does in criminal law generally. The Giles majority
rightfully focuses on the specific intent of the defendant in its analysis of the
forfeiture doctrine because only where such specific intent is present are victims
actually being coerced into not testifying. As noted in Giles, the forfeiture
doctrine has always been concerned with this kind of witness tampering and
coercion.138 If the victim of domestic abuse has in any way been coerced, such
coercion will become manifestly evident, or at least circumstantially evident,
after an inquiry into the defendant’s state of mind, as would be the case with any
other crime. Such a circumstantial inquiry will undoubtedly involve an in-depth
examination into the nature of the abusive relationship. Should such an
examination reveal a strong likelihood of coercion to prevent spousal testimony,
then forfeiture should be presumed. Absent such a finding, forfeiture should be

133. Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 367 (2008).
134. See, e.g., id. at 367–68.
135. For a recent application of a categorical approach by the Supreme Court, see Graham v.
Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010), where the Court applied a categorical approach to juvenile sentencing
by not permitting a juvenile offender to be sentenced to life in prison without some meaningful
opportunity to release. The approach is considered “categorical” because it implicates a specific type
of sentence (life in prison) to a specific class of offenders (juveniles).
136. See, e.g., Giles, 554 U.S. at 380 (Souter, J., concurring).
137. It is unclear whether this presumption is rebuttable. Given that Justice Souter states that such
a finding is per se forfeiture, I assume that it is not.
138. Giles, 554 U.S. at 374.
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avoided. Only in the former case, where a defendant has the requisite specific
intent to prevent his spouse from testifying, does fundamental fairness require
an override of the victim’s autonomy and voice regarding whether to offer
incriminating evidence against her spouse or not.
There is no need to drastically overhaul Giles’s formulation, because a
contextual approach is neither at odds with Justice Scalia’s formulation, nor is it
completely at odds with Justice Souter’s approach. A contextual approach tries
to reconcile both views by recognizing that domestic violence can certainly be
coercive but that the victim should still be able to retain some degree of
autonomy in shaping her own destiny.
For the sake of clarity, it might be best to arrange abusive relationships
along a spectrum from most coercive to least coercive. At the most coercive end
of the spectrum are cases in which there is a dead victim linked to very probative
evidence of systematic abuse and various recantations of prior allegations of
abuse. The presumption of forfeiture is the strongest in these cases because the
victim has already been denied her voice and because there is strong direct or
circumstantial evidence to suggest that the defendant has engaged in severely
coercive behavior.
This evidence should manifest itself into a strong
presumption that the defendant had the requisite intent to prevent the victim
from testifying. As a result, this situation is one more likely to warrant a Souterlike presumption of forfeiture.139
Conversely, on the least coercive end of the spectrum are cases in which
there is a live recanting victim with little evidence of continuous systematic
abuse. This situation is more likely to warrant a Scalia-like approach, where
what little evidence of abuse there is becomes one of many factors to consider in
determining the defendant’s specific intent. However, as noted in Giles, the
determinative factor as to whether to apply the doctrine of forfeiture is always
whether the defendant had the requisite specific intent to prevent the victim
from testifying.140 Any presumption otherwise must be rebuttable in order for the
defendant’s mens rea to remain as the core concern of the forfeiture inquiry.
Obviously, the determination of specific intent becomes much more
muddled in the middle of the spectrum. These complex forfeiture cases, with
live recanting victims in which there is probative evidence of abuse, are the cases
which would be most severely affected by a categorical approach in terms of
overriding the victim’s explicit wishes. In these cases, due to a concern for victim
autonomy, equitable determination of forfeiture should again remain squarely
focused on the specific intent of the defendant. The defendant has the
confrontation privilege under the Sixth Amendment and, therefore, only the
defendant’s intended actions to forfeit this privilege should eradicate his right to
confrontation.
Scalia’s approach is valuable in these intermediate cases, as his view
recognizes that continuous accusations of abuse, or threats of abuse, suggest that

139. Although notably not a per se presumption under my formulation.
140. Giles, 554 U.S. at 361 (“The manner in which the rule was applied makes plain that
unconfronted testimony would not be admitted without a showing that the defendant intended to
prevent a witness from testifying.”) (emphasis added).
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the defendant intended to coerce the victim from testifying.141 Given the
incredible statistics related to victim recantation,142 such coercive tendencies
cannot be denied. For Scalia, evidence of abuse or threats of abuse is one of
several factors used in determining whether the defendant had the requisite
specific intent.143 But Scalia’s approach does not go far enough.
Scalia admits that “[a]cts of domestic violence often are intended to
dissuade a victim from resorting to outside help” and, therefore, can be
suggestive of conduct designed to prevent victim testimony.144 Although Scalia
clearly recognizes that abusive relationships can be coercive and can isolate the
victim, he does not seem to recognize the fact that this abuse or coercion should
be the most important factor in determining whether the defendant had the
requisite specific intent, especially given the lack of otherwise probative evidence
in these cases. Where the degree of violence is severe and where there are
continuous accusations of domestic violence to law enforcement met with violent
spousal retribution, a very strong, but rebuttable, presumption should be
applied. This approach is closer to Souter’s suggested approach in Giles.
Making evidence of abuse and threats of abuse the two most important
factors in determining the defendant’s specific intent strikes a suitable
compromise for those concerned with autonomy and for those justifiably
concerned with possible witness intimidation by domestic abusers. And, since
the defendant’s specific intent can be so hard to prove, especially in the middle of
the spectrum cases, this compromise appeases any fear that Crawford will give
offenders a greater incentive to threaten, coerce, or kill their victims as a means
of ensuring dismissal.145 Meanwhile, this sliding scale analysis ensures that
female autonomy remains intact and that fundamental constitutional protections
will not be further eroded.
But this does not mean that evidence of abuse or threats of abuse should be
the sole determinative factor in deciphering the defendant’s specific intent either.
Such a position would be tantamount to Souter’s approach in Giles, which, unlike
Scalia’s approach, is overinclusive. In addition to evidence of abuse, a trial court
judge might also want to consider the gravity, longevity, and type of abuse, as
well as the extent to which the abuse seems coercive or intended to shield the
victim from obtaining any outside assistance. Other factors to consider may
include: (1) whether there is any recanted testimony; (2) the reasons given by the
victim for recanting her testimony; (3) the reasons given by the victim in
attempting to procure state involvement in the first place; and (4) potential safety
concerns in allowing the victim to remain in the abusive relationship. In
weighing these various factors, trial courts will be able to recognize the
inherently coercive element of intimate partner violence without undermining
the victim’s choice and the defendant’s constitutional protections.
Unless such additional factors are considered, Souter’s broad-sweeping

141. Id. at 377.
142. See supra Section III.
143. Giles, 554 U.S. at 377.
144. Id.
145. Brief for California Partnership to End Domestic Violence et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 34–35, Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008) (No. 07-6053), 2008 WL 859396.
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approach risks considerably eroding the autonomy and voice of a recanting
victim in deciding whether or not she wants to testify against her spouse.
Souter’s approach also overlooks the various policy and practical reasons why
abused women might want to remain in a potentially abusive relationship in the
short term.146 Moreover, a categorical formulation presupposes that the state is
acting in the best interest of the victim in requiring immediate intervention even
though the period of criminal prosecution is the period most likely to culminate
in the victim’s death or in serious injury.
It should be noted that state intervention can and should still play a
fundamental role in these intermediate cases where the evidence of continuous
abuse is not substantial enough to presume forfeiture. However, such state
intervention is better directed at a legislative forum than a judicial one. Other
salient methods exist that can be used to obtain probative evidence that do not
threaten the autonomy or voice of domestic abuse victims by allowing for higher
rates of voluntary compliance. For example, in lieu of the forced introduction of
recanted statements, the legislature could pool state resources into counseling,
witness protection, and other methods of safety planning in order to secure
voluntary victim assistance.147 Some jurisdictions have already attempted to
obtain cooperation in this way and have had considerable success. For example,
the Family Justice Center, a community group that houses 25 domestic violence
service agencies, was recently established in San Diego to combat domestic
violence and foster cooperation between public and private entities that provide
services to victims of domestic violence.148 This agency was highly successful in
obtaining voluntary victim cooperation with both prosecutors and law
enforcement.149 After the agency’s first three years of existence, the San Diego
District Attorney’s Office reported that nearly seventy percent of victims agreed
to testify at trial compared to having nearly seventy percent of victims refuse to
do so a few years prior.150 Such optimistic results suggest that female autonomy
and spousal safety may be better preserved in tandem through legislative action
than through a judicially crafted remedy.
CONCLUSION
This Note is concerned with the application of the forfeiture doctrine in
cases of domestic violence and the effect it can have on a victim’s autonomy,
voice, and inevitably on gender disparity generally. In order to ensure that
female autonomy and gender equality is not further destabilized, the specific
intent of the defendant should remain the guiding marker for the application of
the forfeiture doctrine in cases of domestic violence as in criminal law generally.
Only in cases where the defendant shows clear intent to prevent the victim from
testifying based upon significant direct or circumstantial evidence is the victim

146. See supra Section III.
147. See Ewing, supra note 119, at 97–99 (noting several legislative assistance programs for victims
of domestic violence).
148. See CASEY GWINN & GAEL STRACK, HOPE FOR HURTING FAMILIES: CREATING FAMILY JUSTICE
CENTERS ACROSS AMERICA 55–59 (2006).
149. Id. at 108–09.
150. Id. at 109.
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actually being coerced into not testifying. It is only these cases that merit an
override of the victim’s wishes and the defendant’s constitutional protections.
This is especially true if victims have legitimate reasons to not testify against
their spouses that reasonably align with their immediate best interests.
In order to infer the defendant’s specific intent, a judge should certainly
consider the contextual details of the abusive relationship, as abusive
relationships are inherently coercive. But this consideration alone should not be
per se determinative. Depriving a victim of her autonomy could lead to severe
physical, social and economic ramifications. Moreover, such deprivation could
also threaten female gender equality by not allowing women to decide what is in
their best interests as individuals and as a class. The threat of coercion in
domestic violence relationships is real, but any forced state intervention may be
better directed at legislative action rather than an irrebuttable judicial
presumption.

